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Evo Morales has labelled his government the ‘government of social move-
ments’, and much has been written on relations between social movements
and the state in Bolivia since the turn of the century. The Central Obrera
Boliviana (COB) — Bolivian Workers’ Central — has, however, remained
largely absent from discussions in much of the literature. This article seeks
to analyse the position of the COB under Morales, and to explore the nature
and consequences of its relationship with the government over the past 12
years. The article differentiates between the concepts of labour bureaucracy
and labour officialdom and examines how they can be used as analytical
lenses that shed light on the position of the COB today. The author argues
that during Bolivia’s neoliberal period (1985–2005) the need to look after
the COB bureaucratized union structures, as personal needs of the leadership
were placed above those of the Bolivian working classes. This then allowed
Morales’s government to easily co-opt sections of the labour movements’
leadership to form a labour officialdom, leaving the COB unable to challenge
the continuation of the neoliberal structure of the economy and represent the
majority of the country’s working classes.
INTRODUCTION
Since the election of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) — Movement
Towards Socialism — in Bolivia in 2005, many scholars have critically
examined the integration of social movements into the MAS as the ad-
ministration attempts to construct a ‘government of social movements’ (for
example Albó, 2015; Crabtree and Chaplin, 2013; Escárzaga, 2012; Farthing
and Kohl, 2014; Fontana, 2013a, 2013b; Poweska, 2013; Regalsky, 2010;
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Salazar, 2015). Others have focused on the increasing tensions emerging
around territory and extractivism in Bolivia, the debate over the Territorio
Indı́gena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure (Tipnis) — Isiboro Sécure Na-
tional Park and Indigenous Territory — being firmly at the centre of this
literature (for example Cusicanqui, 2015; Tapia, 2011; Webber, n.d.). The
Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) — Bolivian Workers’ Central — however,
remains understudied in both the Anglophone and Hispanophone literatures.
The need to address the current state of the COB became increasingly evi-
dent during my fieldwork in the Bolivian cities of El Alto, La Paz and Santa
Cruz between January 2016 and May 2017. While there, I regularly attended
meetings of the COB, the neighbourhood councils and the market guilds. I
marched with workers from various sectors, including during the days of the
general strike called by the COB, had countless informal conversations with
rank-and-file workers and conducted more than 100 interviews with for-
mal social movement leaders, government officials and political activists.
Throughout this period the COB was an omnipresent social force, making
its absence in the literature puzzling.
The goal of this article is to address this lacuna by analysing the COB
under the MAS regime from 2006 to the present day. It explores how the
leadership of the COB has become assimilated into the political project of
the MAS, using the distinction between ‘labour bureaucracy’ and ‘labour of-
ficialdom’. A ‘labour bureaucracy’ emerges when a particular configuration
of internal social relations comprising a formalized union structure limits
the actions of union leadership and rank and file alike (Hyman, 1989: 246);
a ‘labour officialdom’ is a group of self-interested individual labour leaders
whose personal interests have come to replace the concerns of their working
class bases. This article uses these two concepts to explore the relationship
between institutional dynamics and political economy, arguing that the COB
was bureaucratized during Bolivia’s neoliberal period (1985–2005) as the
need for the COB to ‘look after’ [cuidar] itself impinged on its ability to
represent rank-and-file workers and adapt to neoliberal economic restruc-
turing.1 This self-interested focus on survival allowed the MAS to construct
corporatist relationships with the COB, aligning the personal interests of
the union leaders with those of the MAS, creating a MASista labour offi-
cialdom.2 Consequently, the COB is unable to represent the majority of the
working classes as neoliberal trends within the economy and labour market
continue.
1. Here Bolivia’s neoliberal period denotes the years 1985–2005, when governments were
following neoliberal policies. Neoliberal trends in the labour market and political economy
more generally have, however, continued beyond this period and into the years of Morales’s
government.
2. I follow Philippe Schmitter’s (1974: 86) classic definition of corporatism as a ‘particular
modal or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized
interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state’.
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The structure of the article is as follows. Firstly I define how the work-
ing classes are understood here. Secondly, I outline the theoretical concepts
of labour bureaucracy and labour officialdom. Thirdly, I sketch the po-
sition of the COB during the period of the National Revolutionary State
(1952–85). Fourthly, I explore some of the changes to the Bolivian working
classes, and political economy more generally, galvanized by neoliberal re-
forms. Fifthly, I briefly profile the GDP contribution of different economic
sectors and the structure of urban working classes. Sixthly, I examine the
ways in which union structures have become co-opted under the MAS,
and how the government has aligned the personal interests of leaders with
their own political project, creating a labour officialdom. Finally, I highlight
some of the detrimental effects the creation of this MAS labour official-
dom has had on the ability of the COB to represent the working-class rank
and file.
DEFINING THE WORKING CLASSES
The term ‘working classes’ as used in this article denotes people who do not
control the key productive resources of a society and thus are either directly
or indirectly dependent on the sale of labour power for their daily repro-
duction (Sears, 2014; Selwyn, 2016). The capitalist production process not
only generates commodities but also the conditions in which classes form
(Lebowitz, 2003). Classes are not formed mechanically through the structural
conditions of the production process, however. The working classes include
not just those who enter the workplace but the swathes of unemployed who
were and will again be wage-earners and those who appear self-employed
but who are, in fact, disguised wage labourers earning just enough to sustain
themselves. The working classes are marked by ‘extensive and complicated
“grey areas”, replete with transitional locations between the “free” wage
laborers and slaves, the self-employed and the lumpenproletarians’ (van der
Linden, 2008: 32). They also include those whose survival is indirectly de-
pendent on wage labour — family dependants, (mostly) women and children
— and who provide the conditions for production through unpaid tasks that
reproduce wage labour on a daily and generational basis (Camfield, 2011:
1–2). As E.P. Thomson (1978: 150) argues, class ‘eventuates as men and
women live their productive relations, and as they experience their determi-
nate situations’ (emphasis in original).
Following the work of Erik Olin Wright (2000) and Beverly Silver (2003),
Benjamin Selwyn uses this processual and relational definition of class to
evaluate the structural and associational power of trade unions. Structural
power denominates the ‘workers’ position in the production process and
their ability to disrupt it’, whereas associational power refers to ‘workers’
collective organization, more often than not via trade unions’ (Selwyn, 2014:
101). While structural power is important in understanding the efficacy of
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certain sectors of the working classes, it does not explain why particular
sectors of workers are more or less well organized and capable of defending
their interests at different times, for this is determined by the experience
of class. These two concepts of structural and associational power help us
connect the concrete abstraction of class to specific historical dynamics,
and in this particular case, help discern the evolution of the strength and
radicalism of different sectors within the COB.
LABOUR BUREAUCRACY AND LABOUR OFFICIALDOM
The heuristic devices of ‘labour bureaucracy’ and ‘labour officialdom’ help
to reveal the interaction between institutional dynamics and political econ-
omy. As the logic of capital spreads across society, it places exigencies
on both labour (the need to find paid work in order to survive) and cap-
ital (the requirement for the continual self-valorization of value through
competition) (Marx, 1867/1982: 301). The incessant need for capital to re-
produce itself leads to a division of labour, particularly into manual and
intellectual tasks. This division of labour spreads across society as the pro-
ductive capacity of capital grows (Marx, 1849/1935: 52). The separation
of intellectual and manual labour under capitalism has led to the separa-
tion of ‘the activity of conceptualising the goals and methods of human
activity from its execution’, placing constraints on the productive activity
of workers’ manual labour (Camfield, 2013: 139). It is not the separation
of intellectual and manual labour itself that defines bureaucracy, but what
this separation has enabled. The monopolization of intellectual labour —
ideas and plans that are put into practice by manual labour — has allowed
a group of individuals charged with decision making to impose rules and
regulations on those who are put to task materializing their ideas (ibid.:
140).
Bureaucracy is, therefore, ‘a mode of existence of social relations in which
people’s activity is organized through formal rules that limit their ability
to determine its character and goals, and which they themselves are not
able to alter with ease’ (Camfield, 2009: 188). Not all rules are necessarily
bureaucratic, only those that impinge on people’s ability to determine and
realize their own goals. This definition avoids casting structural constraints
facing trade unions as monolithic, overdetermining factors by delineating a
dialectical relationship between ‘structure’ and ‘struggle’ (Hurl, 2009: 142),
as well as disentangling ‘labour officialdom’ from ‘labour bureaucracy’
(Camfield, 2013: 134–38).
Labour bureaucracy, as distinct from bureaucracy more generally, arises
from the social relations out of which trade unions form: wage labour. ‘The
origins of the labour bureaucracy’, asserts Charles Post (2005: 3), can be
found ‘in the episodic and discontinuous character of working-class strug-
gle under capitalism’. The working classes are constrained by the need to
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reproduce themselves through earning a wage.3 They must enter the work-
place to survive, restricting the time and energy they possess to engage
in political struggles to transform society. According to Rosa Luxemburg
(1906/2004: 180), the working classes can therefore start their struggle in
one of the places where they live class — the workplace.4 Under the right
conditions it is possible for economic demands to be transformed into polit-
ical demands, and radical political projects can emerge out of labour unions.
However, if the integral rules, regulations or decision-making processes of
a union come to restrict class struggle, its labour bureaucracy inhibits the
union.
The labour leadership is not necessarily a self-interested faction of the
working classes, and does not always become a labour officialdom. How-
ever, if the union structure has become bureaucratized, there is always ‘the
risk that working-class organisations will themselves become divided be-
tween layers exercising different functions. Specialisation can result in a
growing monopoly of knowledge, of centralized information. Knowledge is
power, and a monopoly of it leads to power over people . . . if not checked,
[this can] mean a real division between new bosses and the bossed-over mass’
(Mandel, 1992: 59–60; cited in Post, 2005: 4). The separation of a group of
leaders from the rank and file ‘privatizes’ the collective will of the working
classes as these leaders monopolize the centralized knowledge of the union.
Labour leaders who grow separated from the movement they represent be-
come detached from the lived experience of class, and come to represent the
objectification of the labour movement: the labour bureaucracy. The danger
contained in the division between the labour leadership and rank and file
lies in the separation of planning and conception from execution. Under
certain conditions this separation allows the particular interests of individ-
ual leaders to supplant the collective will of the working classes. In other
words, a labour leadership that is separated from its base risks becoming a
labour officialdom, advocating its own will rather than the demands of the
masses.
THE FORMATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE COB
Between 1952 and 1985, the period of the National Revolutionary State, the
COB was an integral part of the Bolivian society and nation (Garcı́a Linera,
3. This reproduction includes the basic requirements of food, clothes and sleep needed to get
the labourer to the workplace from one day to the next, the generational reproduction of
the workforce through biological reproduction, and the fostering and maintenance of social
relationships and practices that reproduce society as a whole. See Tithi Bhattacharya’s
(2017) excellent edited collection on social reproduction theory for more detail.
4. It is important to stress the workplace is only one place where class is experienced. In her
seminal book on Bolivian miners, June Nash (1993) shows the importance of the family
and the community as sites where class is also lived.
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2014).5 The COB was formed after the 1952 nationalist-populist revolution
and subsequently entered into co-government with the Movimiento Na-
cionalista Revolucionario (MNR) — National Revolutionary Movement —
between 1952 and 1957 (Hylton and Thomson, 2007). Critical Marxist René
Zavaleta Mercado was one of the most lucid thinkers to tackle this period of
Bolivian history. He argues that in Bolivia, the modern forms of the state,
nation and society (historical formations in Zavaleta’s schema) emerged
through the crossing (not replacement) of national sentiment and class sen-
timent through the MNR and the COB (Zavaleta, 2009: 156). The history
of Bolivia before the 1952 revolution was one of antagonism between the
nation and an outward-facing oligarchy (or in the worst cases simply foreign
oligarchs), leading to a nation that was composed of subaltern classes.
The working class movement in Bolivia and its institutional expression,
the COB, were therefore intimately tied to the project of nation building and
the state form of the National Revolution of 1952, regardless of the regime
type (civil or military). Dominated by the miners, the most radical section of
Bolivian society at the time, the COB headed struggles against the military
dictatorships between 1964 and 1982, even during periods of extreme state
repression and exile of the COB’s leadership. During this period the radi-
calism of the Bolivian working classes radiated out of the mining centres
because of the structural power and the ideological formation of the miners
(Zavaleta, 2009; see also Nash, 1993). Despite numbering only 53,000 in
1952 — approximately 3 per cent of the total population — the miners were
responsible for the production of 95 per cent of foreign exports and 45 per
cent of government revenue (Hylton and Thomson, 2007: 78). The deep-
seated tradition of trade union organization and militancy within the mines
transformed the structural power of the miners into associational power
which extended beyond their sector and allowed the COB to demonstrate
class independence from the state at particular moments, such as the revolu-
tion of 1952 itself, the protests against the coup d’ètat of Alberto Natusch in
1979 and in their rejection of co-government in 1982. One sign of the COB’s
power during this period was the formation of the Confederación Sindical
Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) — Trade Union
Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers — where the peasant federation
formally broke their pact with the military and became part of the COB (Cu-
sicanqui, 2003). However, as Zavaleta also noted, the COB often became
tangled up in the dynamics of the National Revolutionary State — which
was determined to create a national bourgeoisie — through corporatist rela-
tions, which restricted its ability to pursue a revolutionary project. This left
the COB unable to extend working class power throughout the country even
in moments of crisis in bourgeois hegemony, particularly the Bonapartist
5. Although the work of Garcı́a Linera is now overdetermined by his political function as
vice-president (see Baker 2015; McNelly, 2017; Webber, 2015), his early work, especially
on the Bolivian labour movement (republished in 2014), represented vital interventions.
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moment following the 1952 revolution and the Popular Assembly of 1971
(Ouviña, 2016).6 There were thus moments of revolutionary potential for the
working classes that were not capitalized upon by the COB, which proved
unable to produce a subjective consciousness of a national class uniting all
the disparate subaltern groups of the Bolivian ‘nation’ (Ouviña, 2016: 69).
The structure of the COB reflects the historical power of certain sectors,
particularly the miners, during the era of the National Revolutionary state.
The Executive Secretary is always a miner, and the second in command, the
General Secretary, is drawn from the factory workers. The COB is hierar-
chically divided into three levels: (1) the Comité Ejecutivo Nacional (CEN)
— National Executive Committee; (2) the sectoral confederations and fed-
erations and regional centrals, the Central Obrera Departmentales (CODs)
— Departmental Workers’ Centrals — and the Central Obrera Regionales
(CORs) — Regional Workers’ Centrals; and (3) individual unions (Garcı́a
Linera et al., 2004). The COB purports to be the ‘unity of the working
classes’ and, due to its size, it needs rules, regulations and a hierarchical
structure (ibid.: 46). The CEN is the centre of decision making in the COB,
but is held to account by the dependency of the leaders on the bases: since the
organization’s power comes from the threat of mobilization, the leadership
of the COB is only as powerful as its capacity to mobilize Bolivia’s working
classes (Garcı́a Linera et al., 2004). The organizational structure of the COB
enables it to operate across the entire country and engage the state directly as
the representative of the Bolivian working classes. Moreover, this centralized
labour organization can coordinate nationwide actions — by disseminating
demands and strategies through sectoral federations and the regional cen-
trals — and mount enough pressure to have influence on the government
itself.
THE WORKING CLASSES DURING THE NEOLIBERAL PERIOD
Neoliberalism, which arrived in Bolivia in 1985, introduced a period of mas-
sive proletarianization, in which both peasants from rural areas and women
were drawn into the labour force, increasing the size of the economically
active population (EAP) in the country by 50 per cent between 1989 and
1995 (Arze and Maita, 2000: 36). This burgeoning reserve army of labour
made it ‘possible for capital to use “the informal sector” to complete the
circuit of capital’, obscuring wage-labour relations, cheapening the price
of labour and producing underemployment (Lebowitz, 2009: n.p.).7 The
6. See Zavaleta (2009) for an explanation of the Bonapartist moment of the 1952 revolution.
7. Bolivia’s Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA) — Centre for
Labour and Agrarian Development Studies — defines underemployment as either when
someone works fewer hours per week than they wish or when there are qualitative deficien-
cies in employment, such as low levels of income, inadequate tasks for the worker’s skill
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experience of class in Bolivia was transformed drastically under neoliberal-
ism,8 with exploitation growing through increasing informality and precarity
experienced by workers.9 Fixed, formal contracts were replaced by short-
term work, fixed wages by piecemeal rates and the well-defined boundaries
of businesses by networks of outsourced companies (Arze and Maita, 2000).
The public sector was reduced to a bare minimum and the workers of the
state mining company Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Comibol) — Mining
Corporation of Bolivia — were dismissed, forcing most relocated miners
into urban areas.
The neoliberalized economy in Bolivia comprised 10 large-scale firms,
100 foreign and domestic financial groups, a smattering of industrial produc-
ers and some 500,000 microcompanies employing one to four people and
working mainly in commerce, transport and agriculture (Grebe López, 1998:
8–9). Dynamics of intra-class stratification in the half-million microfirms in-
tensified during this period, blurring the distinction between capitalists and
wage labourers (Breman, 2015). Informalized workers in the street markets
and workshops where the majority of these microcompanies are based have
even come to think of themselves as independent operators, a symptom
of the extent of the domination of capital over labour under neoliberalism
(Lebowitz, 2009).
One of the facets of neoliberal reform was to wrestle the control of state-
owned enterprises from the COB, and the government literally starved the
miners out of the mining encampments, massively depleting the influence
of the COB in the process. The COB always had a rigid hierarchical or-
ganizational structure, but due to the structural power and radicalism of its
core — the miners — the organization’s leadership was able to maintain
its connection with its bases, even when leaders were forced into exile by
the dictatorships (1964–1982) and the COB assumed a clandestine form.
The miners’ disappearance as political actors led to a conservative current
within the COB, which was unable to see an alternative beyond neoliberalism
(Castro López et al., 2012). Such was the weakening of the COB that many
labour leaders concerned themselves with its organizational reproduction,
leading to processes of increased bureaucratization. In the worst cases, such
as the railway workers, neoliberal reform eliminated rank-and-file workers,
leaving the CEN leadership as an empty shell.10 The defensive position of
set or low labour productivity. See the methodology annex in CEDLA-ILDIS (1995) for a
fuller discussion on underemployment.
8. A confluence of hidden wage labour, non-capitalist relations and high levels of precarity
have always characterized the working conditions of the peasantry. Neoliberalism increased
the size of the working classes and the urban informal economy, however, transforming the
experience of class for many Bolivians who were formerly peasants.
9. Escóbar de Pabón et al. (2014: 35) argue that different levels of precarity are determined by
wages, job security and access to social security.
10. Author interview with Lucio González, leader within the COB during the 1980s and 1990s,
La Paz, 15 March 2016. See also Fornillo (2011); Garcı́a Linera et al. (2004).
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some labour leaders during this period benefited political parties, who agreed
deals with individual leaders and came to influence the inner dynamics of the
CEN (Garcı́a Linera et al., 2004: 77). Indeed, then-leader Oscar Salas struck
a bargain with the Jaime Paz Zamora government (1988–1993), severely lim-
iting the ability of the CEN to oppose the first privatization drive. Although
different sectors vehemently resisted such changes, the COB was unable
to unify diverse interests and mount a defence against neoliberal policies
(ibid.: 76). In short, neoliberalism helped form a labour bureaucracy within
the COB.
The COB did not disappear entirely, however, and teachers, struggling
to prevent educational reforms, and workers of the Caja Nacional de Salud
(National Health Fund), fighting against the privatization of healthcare, led
the struggles of the labour movement from the time of the presidency of
Jaime Paz Zamora onwards.11 The social struggles that erupted between 2000
and 2005 replaced the pro-neoliberal COB leaders with an anti-neoliberal
bloc led by Jaime Solares (Castro López et al., 2012). Under this new
radical leadership the COB played an important part in the struggles against
neoliberalism in 2003, although it was no longer the protagonist in social
protest. The COB’s programme of struggle, published in September 2003,
would form the foundation of the October Agenda, the set of demands
at the heart of the Gas War during October 2003. The Gas War was the
apogee of the social struggles against neoliberalism between 2000 and 2005,
and saw a coalition of neighbourhood associations, indigenous movements,
labour unions and market vendors lock down the city of El Alto for more
than two weeks, ending only when neoliberal president Gonzalo Sánchez de
Lozada left the country (Webber, 2011). Workers from the mining centre
Huanuni were central actors during the Gas War, and Sánchez de Lozada
only resigned after he heard that the army had allowed 58 trucks of miners
to pass a checkpoint on their way to La Paz (Dunkerley, 2007: 139). The
election of Evo Morales in 2005 was the parliamentary expression of these
struggles.
THE URBAN WORKING CLASSES IN CONTEMPORARY BOLIVIA
In Bolivia today most economic activity is focused along the tri-city axis
of La Paz/El Alto–Cochabamba–Santa Cruz (which replaced the old axis of
La Paz–Oruro–Potosı́ in the 1970s) (Klein, 2003). These three departments
have been responsible for the production of around 70 per cent of GDP over
the past 15 years (Escóbar de Pabón et al., 2014: 22). Of the approximately
11 million Bolivians, 7.1 million live in the three departments in which the
axis cities are contained, so they give a fairly representative picture of the
11. Author interview with Lucio González, La Paz, 15 March 2016; see also Garcı́a Linera et al.
(2004).
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Table 1. Annual Growth in GDP by Economic Activity, Bolivia 1989–2016 (%)
Economic Activity 1989–97 1998–2005 2006–12 2013–16 1989–2005 2006–16
GDP (at market price) 4.28 2.93 4.76 4.87 3.64 5.49
GDP (at basic price) 4.23 2.79 4.51 4.58 3.55 5.17
1. Mining and Hydrocarbons 5.14 4.49 6.79 2.70 4.84 6.05
2. Manufacturing Industries 4.54 2.83 4.82 4.91 3.74 5.47
3. Electricity, Gas and Water 7.43 2.58 5.51 5.88 5.15 6.15
4. Construction 5.84 1.10 9.45 7.61 3.61 9.78
5. Commerce 4.60 2.20 4.36 4.27 3.47 4.72
6. Transport and Communications 6.31 3.34 4.84 5.21 4.91 5.65
7. Financial Services and Business 5.57 2.23 5.89 6.45 3.99 6.63
8. Services 3.40 2.72 3.49 5.41 3.08 6.3
9. Agriculture 3.59 2.45 2.31 4.18 3.05 3.29
Extractive/Primary Sector (1) 5.14 4.49 6.79 2.70 4.84 6.05
Secondary Sector (2, 3 and 4) 5.94 2.17 6.59 6.30 4.16 7.13
Services/Tertiary Sector (5, 6, 7 and 8) 4.97 2.62 5.07 5.69 3.86 5.83
Source: adapted from website of the Instituto Nacional de Estadı́stica (INE) — National Institute of Statistics:
www.ine.gob.bo/ (accessed 10 April 2017).




Economic Activity Total Waged Non-waged Total Waged Non-waged
Total 3.6 5.1 1.6 3.5 2.4 4.7
1. Mining and Hydrocarbons 3.8 −3.2 27.4 0.3 −5.0 24.8
2. Manufacturing Industries 4.6 5.1 4.0 3.1 3.5 2.7
3. Electricity, Gas and Water 3.2 3.2 0 2.3 2.3 0
4. Construction 5.8 8.2 1.6 10.2 6.2 17.3
5. Commerce −3.7 −1.6 −4.5 3.5 5.2 2.8
6. Transport and Communications 5.7 2.4 10.3 5.7 −2.5 14.8
7. Financial Services and Business 3.9 3.2 5.4 −1.0 0.1 −2.7
8. Services 9.1 8.1 13.5 1.9 1.4 4.7
Extractive/Primary Sector (1) 3.8 −3.2 27.4 0.3 −5.0 24.8
Manufacturing/Secondary Sector (2, 3 and 4) 4.9 6.2 3.4 4.9 4.3 5.5
Services/Tertiary Sector (5, 6, 7 and 8) 3.1 4.9 0.9 3.0 1.8 4.3
Source: Escóbar de Pabón et al. (2014: 28).
Bolivian urban working classes as a whole (INE, 2015). Tables 1 to 4 offer
some background quantitative data: Table 1 presents GDP growth broken
down by sector over the period 1989–2016; Table 2 examines the growth
of waged and non-waged employment for different economic sectors; and
Tables 3 and 4 give an overview of the percentage of workers employed in
each sector and whether they are waged or not.
Despite a discursive emphasis on change and ‘21st century socialism’, the
structure of Bolivia’s economy has generally continued in a similar manner
under Evo Morales to that of the preceding period. As Table 1 shows, average
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Table 3. Axis Cities: Employment by Economic Activity, 2001–11 (%)
Economic Activity 2001 2007 2008 2011
Total 100 100 100 100
1. Mining and Hydrocarbons 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.9
2. Manufacturing Industries 17.0 18.0 20.7 20.5
3. Electricity, Gas and Water 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.4
4. Construction 7.9 9.1 6.4 8.0
5. Commerce 35.6 28.2 35.0 34.5
6. Transport and Communications 8.0 9.2 9.6 10.4
7. Financial Services and Business 7.5 7.7 6.6 5.6
8. Services 23.0 26.9 20.3 19.7
Extractive/Primary Sector (1) 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.9
Manufacturing/Secondary Sector (2, 3 and 4) 25.3 27.4 27.6 28.9
Services/Tertiary Sector (5, 6, 7 and 8) 74.1 72.0 71.5 70.2
Source: Escóbar de Pabón et al. (2014: 25)
Table 4. Axis Cities: Rate of Waged Employment by Economic Activity,
2001–11 (%)
Rate of Waged Employment Var %
Economic Activity 2001 2007 2008 2011 2001–07 2008–11
Total 50.4 57.8 52.7 51.0 7.4 −1.7
1. Mining and Hydrocarbons 90.1 59.2 88.1 75.1 −30.9 −12.9
2. Manufacturing Industries 50.2 51.8 48.1 48.7 1.6 0.6
3. Electricity, Gas and Water 84 100.0 100.0 100.0 16.0 0.0
4. Construction 59.6 68.7 67.9 60.3 9.1 −7.6
5. Commerce 24.8 28.8 28.1 29.5 4.0 1.4
6. Transport and Communications 63.5 52.2 59.2 46.4 −11.3 −12.8
7. Financial Services and Business 65.6 66.7 60.4 62.4 1.1 2.0
8. Services 69.3 78.2 85.7 84.4 8.9 −1.3
Extractive/Primary Sector (1) 90.1 59.2 88.1 75.1 −30.9 −12.9
Manufacturing/Secondary Sector (2, 3 and 4) 53.6 57.8 53.5 52.6 4.2 −0.9
Services/Tertiary Sector (5, 6, 7 and 8) 50.9 71.5 51.9 50.0 20.6 −1
Source: Escóbar de Pabón et al. (2014: 29)
GDP growth was greater over the period 2006–16 than 1989–2005, averaging
5.49 per cent compared to 3.64 per cent. With a few exceptions, however,
the growth patterns across sectors continued in a similar manner during
this period (see Table 1). Although the extractive industry has continued to
be important, growing at just over 6 per cent annually between 2006 and
2016, low global oil prices in recent years have had a knock-on effect on
both natural gas and mineral prices in the global market, meaning that the
extractive sector registered a negative growth rate over the 2015–16 period
(see Table 1).12
The secondary sector (manufacturing, utilities and construction) has
shown the fastest growth over the last decade, at 7.13 per cent. There are
12. In Bolivia, natural gas rather than oil is the most important hydrocarbon resource.
12 Angus McNelly
a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the part of the manufacturing sector
with direct linkages to the extractive industries has grown impressively, with
industries linked to the processing of hydrocarbons and non-metallic min-
erals growing at over 6 and 9 per cent respectively.13 The overall growth
figure of 5.47 per cent in the manufacturing industry, however, obscures the
poor growth rate in the textiles industry (below 2 per cent annually), which
employs more people than the extractive industry. Moreover, the secondary
sector’s growth rate is inflated by the high growth rate in the construction
sector (9.78 per cent compared to 3.61 per cent previously), driven by state
expenditure on large-scale infrastructure projects, as well as the construc-
tion boom in the cities of La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. Planned
state expenditure between 2010 and 2015 on electrical energy and transport
(the infrastructure required by transnational capital involved in extractivism)
represented 20.05 per cent and 17.05 per cent respectively (Salazar, 2015:
263).14 The tertiary sector (commerce, financial services and services) has
also grown at almost 6 per cent and all of the urban sectors have outperformed
the sectoral growth in agriculture, which languishes behind at 3.29 per cent
annually over the 10-year period. Commerce and services do not contribute
directly to capital production, however — although, as political economist
Jeffery Webber (2016: 1868) highlights, they do provide the conditions for
its reproduction — and represent the circulation of pre-existing capital that
concentrates at certain places rather than productive activities. Their growth
rates are explained by underemployment and overall conditions of informal-
ity allowing for the flexibility of capital rather than an increase in investment
or productivity.
The extractive industries have increased their share of Bolivian exports
under Morales but employ few workers and are poorly integrated into the Bo-
livian economy. Table 2 shows that job creation in the extractive industries
is small, with only 0.3 per cent employment growth in the sector between
2008 and 2011. Despite the profitable nature of the sector, it continues to
employ less than 1 per cent of the labour force (see Table 3.). While the
relatively small number of miners did not prevent them from being a politi-
cal force during the National Revolutionary period, today most employment
in mining is non-waged (through cooperatives) and precarious, with the
four large-scale capital-intensive operations responsible for the bulk of min-
eral exports offering few employment opportunities (Dı́az-Cuellar, 2017:
123).15 Waged employment growth has been negative in this sector, and the
13. Figures from the website of the Instituto Nacional de Estadı́stica (INE) — National Institute
of Statistics: www.ine.gob.bo/ (accessed 10 April 2017).
14. Roads do also provide infrastructure for healthcare and education services that have im-
proved the lives of many rural people. However, as the conflict over the road through the
Tipnis national park has shown, roads are built not to provide these services to the greatest
number of people but as a part of a wider regional infrastructure project aimed at creating
the conditions for extractivism (Salazar, 2015: 262–64; see also Zibechi, 2012).
15. These four operations are Sinchi Wayra, San Cristóbal, Manquiri and Panamerican Silver.
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state-employed miners represented in the COB are a minority and dependent
on the state for their survival. Huanuni, the only mine fully run by the Comi-
bol, went bankrupt in 2002 and only passed into the government’s control
in 2007, when it was nationalized along with the Vinto sink-and-float plant
(Dı́az-Cuellar, 2012). It remains inefficient, both in terms of technology and
the number of miners it employs, and depends on state subsidies for its sur-
vival — the latest of which was a US$ 36 million investment by the MAS
government in 2016 (Página Siete, 2017).
The gas workers find themselves in a similar position. During the neolib-
eral period, cut-rate royalty and taxation schemes and the agreement to build
a pipeline to connect Bolivian gas reserves with large Brazilian markets
incentivized investment in Bolivia’s hydrocarbons sector, which replaced
mining as the major source of state revenue (Kaup, 2014). However, pri-
vate investment was focused on developing Bolivia’s known reserves rather
than on exploration, creating few jobs (Kaup, 2014: 1844). The ‘national-
ization’ of hydrocarbons in 2006 and the re-centring of the state hydrocar-
bons firm Yacimientos Petrolı́feros Fiscales de Bolivia (YPFB) — Bolivian
State Petroleum Company — as the main player and obligatory partner to
transnational firms in exploration increased employment in the sector. Old
hydrocarbons workers who had lost their jobs during the 1990s were re-hired
by YPFB, and thus became dependent for employment on future exploration
of possible reserves led by the state (Kaup, 2014).
Today, the COB is operating in an increasingly informalized labour mar-
ket detached from the sectors producing GDP growth. The COB, in accor-
dance with its historical modus operandi, represents only waged workers
employed with a fixed contract, so many of the non-waged urban work-
ing classes remain unrepresented by the labour central.16 The transport and
communications (5.7 per cent) and construction (10.2 per cent) sectors were
the only two sectors to create more jobs than the average (3.5 per cent). In
both cases, however, most of this employment growth was accounted for by
non-waged employment: waged employment growth was actually negative
in the transport and communications sector. Overall, waged employment
(2.4 per cent) has grown at half the rate of non-waged employment (4.9 per
cent), and although the proportion of waged workers increased by 7.4 per
cent between 2001 and 2007, it decreased by 1.7 per cent between 2008
and 2011 (see Table 4). The majority of people (over 70 per cent) continue
16. Work on informal markets in Bolivia has argued that informalized street and market vendors
and artisanal producers are organized not through labour unions, but through market guilds
which operate independently of both the COB and the state (see Tassi et al., 2013; Tassi
et al., 2015). This argument appears to be corroborated by my experiences with the COB.
Whilst market vendors and merchants (especially those in La Paz’s twin city of El Alto)
have a formal affiliation with the COB through regional centrals and vendor unions, these
groups were absent from the four ampliados (national meetings) that I attended, and were
not present on the marches of the COB during the general strikes in June and July 2016
(Author’s fieldnotes January 2016–May 2017).
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to be employed in the tertiary sector, which has (approximately) the same
structure as when it was consolidated during the 1990s.17 Most of the urban
working classes work in services, commerce or transport. Whereas 85 per
cent of employees in the service sector are waged, this is true for only 30
per cent involved in commercial activities (see Table 4). Overall, this means
the labour movement has lost the structural power it once had. This does not
mean it is irrelevant, however, but rather highlights the change in its position
within Bolivian society.
LABOUR OFFICIALDOM UNDER THE MAS: CO-OPTATION AND
DEMOBILIZATION
Under the MAS there has been a shift in relations between the govern-
ment and labour movements in Bolivia. Over the last decade, relations
with the government have consolidated the bureaucratization of the labour
union structures started under neoliberalism. The COB has been increas-
ingly affected by its political alliances with the government, leading to
the formation of a MASista labour officialdom within the COB. The MAS
government has worked hard to maintain good relations with the labour
movement, and the COB has become an important ally, offering support
in the press and, equally importantly, not marching against the govern-
ment when policy is announced. This relationship reached its apogee in
November 2013, when the COB signed an agreement, ratified in an am-
pliado (national meeting) of the COB in Santa Cruz, which formalized the
COB’s support for the MAS government.18 Executive secretaries have been
offered positions with the MAS political party when they finish their lead-
ership terms inside the COB. Leaders have been invited to meetings with
government ministers and been given a chance to help shape government
projects.
The Labour Officialdom of the MAS
The MASista labour officialdom does not control the whole of the COB,
which still contains critics of the government, but it does include the more
important positions of power, including members of the executive commit-
tee, the leaders of the miners and construction workers (who are building
all the large-scale infrastructure projects), some of the leaders of the factory
17. See Arze and Maita (2000). I have not included labour market data from the 1990s in my
tables as the categories used in the household surveys are not directly comparable to the
later surveys.
18. Author interview with Valerio Ayaviri Lazaro, Executive Secretary of the Construction
Workers’ Confederation.
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workers and the leaders of the CODs.19 Why this group has emerged within
the COB can be gleaned through an examination of some of the trends within
the labour movement over the past 10 years.
One of the most visible signs that a labour officialdom explicitly con-
nected to the MAS is emerging is the absorption of former leaders of the
labour movement into the MAS political party, a number of whom have
served as ministers or deputies for the government. José Pimentel, leader
of La Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB)
— the Trade Union Federation of Bolivian Mineworkers — between 1980
and 1988, was the Minister of Mines and Metallurgy between 2010 and
2012; Walter Delgadillo, the Executive Secretary of the COB in 1985,
became the Minister of Work and Employment between 2007 and 2009,
and then of Public Works from 2009 to 2011; Guillermo Dalence was
a mining leader who became Minister of Mines and Metallurgy between
2006 and 2007; he was succeeded by Alberto Echazú, one of the COB’s
executive committee during the 1980s.20 The MAS government has in-
tegrated past labour leaders into its government in part to neutralise the
risk of experienced leaders organizing or offering advice to any opposi-
tion to the government that could come from some sections of the labour
movement. It has tied figureheads of the labour movement to the political
project of the MAS and used pre-existing personal relationships to influence
the COB.
The integration of important figures from inside the labour movement
is not constrained to former leaders, with even current leaders inside the
COB being offered pegas — the colloquial term for positions of power
given for political reasons — by the MAS. This has become a common
story within the COB (and other social organizations) recently, with the
government offering generous political positions or projects in return for
support for the MAS government; and it has undoubtedly been a con-
tributing factor in the co-optation of the labour movement over the past
10 years. A number of leaders within the COB lament leaders being bought
by the MAS, citing this as the underlying factor inhibiting the mobiliza-
tion of certain sectors.21 The clearest example of porous boundaries be-
tween the COB and the MAS is that of Pedro Montes, who became a
MAS senator in 2014. Executive Secretary of the COB from 2006 to 2012,
Montes’s meteoric rise in politics outside the labour movement has led
some to question whether he has ‘sold’ the COB in exchange for political
favours.22
19. This sketch of the MASista labour officialdom comes from observations made during COB
ampliados, formal interviews and more informal conversations with leaders and rank and
file within the COB between January 2016 and May 2017.
20. Author interview with Lucio González, La Paz, 15 March 2016.
21. Author’s field notes, January 2016–May 2017.
22. Author interview with Boris Villa Valdez, La Paz, 26 July 2016.
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The result of this revolving door between the COB and the MAS has
been the displacement of the general interests of the working classes by the
political interests of the MAS, as the political project of the MAS has be-
come the personal interest of some of the labour leadership. This has created
a labour officialdom that depends for its survival on the MAS party struc-
tures rather than on the working class rank and file, which impinges on
the COB’s ability to challenge and counteract government actions. The de-
bilitating effects of this labour officialdom on the COB has led to fierce
internal debates, with the more radical sectors who remain outside the gov-
ernment’s influence arguing for union independence. This group — which
includes some leaders of the factory workers, the workers of the public
healthcare system and National Health Fund, urban teachers, pensioners
and the regional COD-Cochabamba and COD-Potosı́ — draws on the rad-
ical history of the COB and the Tesis de Pulacayo (Pulacayo Thesis), a
famous revolutionary document dating from the 1940s, that posited that
the independence of the working classes was key to maintaining a revo-
lutionary path (Lora, 1946). So far, however, this position has failed to
unite the CEN and has instead cemented the bifurcation between those
who support the government and the more radical sectors of the labour
movement.
Looking After the COB
The labour bureaucracy that formed during the neoliberal period has helped
the creation of a labour officialdom linked to the MAS. Along with the
union structure of the COB, the cordial relationship between the COB and
the MAS has become a gain to be defended. The opportunity for the COB
to contribute to proposed government legislation and projects — giving the
labour movement an opportunity to influence legislation affecting the for-
mal working classes — represents a departure from previous governments.
For example, in the construction sector, the Construction Workers’ Con-
federation (an affiliate of the COB) worked together with the Cámara de
Construcción (the conglomeration of Bolivian construction firms) and the
government to draw up a plan to implement health and safety procedures
in the construction sector.23 Recently the COB was able to work with the
government to modify the General Employment Law to ostensibly ensure
labour stability (Palacios, 2017).
One of the arguments presented by the labour officialdom to justify an
amiable relationship with the government is that it is an opportunity to win
such gains as social security and employment insurance from the govern-
ment, improved conditions that would not be granted otherwise. Indeed,
23. Author interview with Valerio Ayaviri Lazaro, La Paz, 7 July 2016.
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the leader of the construction workers, Valerio Ayaviri Lazaro, claims that
it is in the interests of Bolivian capitalists to encourage a split between
the government and the COB because they do not want to adhere to new
regulations that the government might implement.24 Dialogue between the
COB and government ministries, in many sectors, is portrayed as a victory
of past union struggles, while continued cooperation with the government
(as opposed to strikes, blockages and hunger strikes) is depicted as the only
way forward for the COB. This position is articulated by some leaders within
the ampliados and congresses of the COB as the need to ‘look after’ [cuidar]
the COB. The COB, it is argued, is only powerful because of its historical
political actions, the past struggles and gains of previous generations, par-
ticularly those of the Trotskyist miners during the period 1952–1985, when
they produced the majority of Bolivian exports.
Today the workers of the large transnational firms or state mining and
hydrocarbon companies are responsible for almost 70 per cent of exports.
Gas workers, who produce the bulk of exports, are dependent on state invest-
ment in the sector and contingent on continued exploration led by the state
firm YPFB (Kaup, 2014: 1847). The continuation of neoliberal employment
regimes in the majority of the labour market disciplines workers with a
waged job in a sector accumulating capital. The state of constant flux for the
majority of the working classes creates a large reserve pool of labour under-
mining the bargaining position of workers in the extractive industry. Leaders
co-opted by the MAS therefore argue that because the working classes no
longer possess such structural power, it would be foolish to undermine the
power of the COB through ineffective strike action or breaking relationships
with the MAS government.
It is not just structural power that the COB has lost, however. This de-
fensive position is symptomatic of the broader loss of political ideology
suffered during the 1980s when the radicalism of the miners was dissipated
by their historic defeat and subsequent relocalization at the hands of ne-
oliberalism. The radical politics of the miners — itself a result of Marxist
reading groups in the mineshafts, a long accumulation of the experiences of
violence struggles against the state and the harsh daily reality for the miners
and their families in the 20th century mining encampments (see Nash, 1993)
— disappeared over the neoliberal period, denying the COB the theoretical
toolbox needed to mount effective struggle on behalf of the working classes
over this period. The gas workers did mount a number of important struggles
during the 1990s, but they never had the same ideological formation as the
miners. In sum, the loss of political radicalism coupled with the conserva-
tive self-interest of some leaders has created a labour officialdom within




THE EFFECTS OF THE MAS LABOUR OFFICIALDOM
The creation of the MAS labour officialdom has debilitated the position
of the labour movement under the MAS government. The ability of the
COB to impact government policy or shape the political project of the MAS
has been limited. The labour officialdom wedded to the political project
of the MAS has undermined the ability of the COB to resist anti-labour
legislation. Moreover, the COB has been unable (or unwilling) to adapt to
the increasingly informal nature of wage labour experienced by the majority
of the Bolivian working classes.
Despite apparent opportunities for the labour movement to have input
into government projects and policy, the needs of capital still supersede
those of labour. For example, despite the head of the Construction Workers’
Confederation, Valerio Ayaviri Lazaro, stressing the importance of dialogue
with the MAS, the government has been unwilling to impose existing labour
regulations on Chinese firms working on large infrastructure projects in
the country. The contracts agreed with Chinese consortia are signed under
the old labour regulations from the neoliberal period, stripping workers of
basic labour rights and lowering the minimum wage to 440 bolivianos a
month (about US$ 64), less than a quarter of the official minimum wage.25
The interests of international capital thus trump the supposed gains of the
Bolivian workers under the MAS, and access to government officials has not
enabled the Construction Workers’ Confederation to force the government
to address this issue.
Another example of the limited effects of dialogue with the govern-
ment is the railway workers’ involvement in three large-scale railway infra-
structure projects: (1) the Bulo Bulo–Montero line on the border of Santa
Cruz and Cochabamba; (2) a metropolitan train system between Montero
and Santa Cruz; and (3) a metropolitan network linking Sacaba and the
city of Cochabamba. The projects have been littered with controversy, not
least because the Chinese firm China CAMC Engineering — the company
implicated in the Gabriela Zapata scandal26 — was awarded the Bulo Bulo–
Mondero contract before being stripped of responsibility for the project due
to negligence in December 2015 (ANF, 2015). During the National Revo-
lutionary State the railway workers’ union ran a series of technical training
schools across the country, but these were closed when the 1994 Law of
Capitalization privatized the national railway company, Empresa Nacional
de Ferrocarriles (ENFE) (Kohl, 2004: 902–03). The railway workers have
asked the government whether they can participate in the planning phase of
the projects, using their technical knowledge of railways in Bolivia to act
25. Author interview with Valerio Ayaviri Lazaro, La Paz, 7 July 2016.
26. Evo Morales was accused of having a child with Gabriela Zapata, a central negotiator
who was working for CAMC, negotiating contracts with the Bolivia government (McNelly,
2016).
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as consultants.27 The government has denied their request, placing the de-
mands of Chinese firms above those of Bolivian labour to create an attractive
investment environment for Chinese capital.
The conflict around the Empresa Pública Nacional Estratégica de Tex-
tiles (Enatex) — National Strategic Public Textile Company — represented
the biggest test for the COB in recent years, and its failure to impact on
the government decision is indicative of the effect that MAS labour official-
dom has had on the movement. In May 2016 the state textiles factory run
by Enatex was closed by supreme decree, with a loss of 900 jobs (Cuiza,
2016). Many inside the labour movement contend that the move mirrors the
dismissals under neoliberal governments (Erbol Digital, 2016), labelling it
‘anti-constitutional’ on the grounds that it violates the enshrined right to
‘employment stability’.28 There are concerns that the supreme decree could
be extended and used to close other state enterprises — anxieties that were
further amplified in June 2016 by the closure of Bolivia’s postal company,
Empresa de Correos de Bolivia (Ecobol) (Achtenberg, 2016). In response,
the COB announced the first national strikes since it entered into its pact
with the government in November 2013 (Página Siete, 2016). Strike action
was ineffective, however, and many within the labour movement argued
that the need to look after the COB superseded the need to fight for the dis-
missed Enatex workers.29 Despite 24–, 48– and 72–hour strikes, the COB
was unable to resolve the Enatex conflict and the majority of workers were
forced to take a redundancy package. The COB failed in its attempt to call
an indefinite strike and was ultimately powerless to prevent the government
imposing the costs of a failed state enterprise on the working classes.
The most serious shortcoming of the COB under the MAS has been its
inability to tackle increasing precarity — determined by income levels,
employment stability and access to social security (Escóbar de Pabón et al.,
2014) — among the Bolivian working classes. Informality has increased
from 59.7 per cent of the employed population in 2006 to 62 per cent in 2014
under Evo Morales (Arze, 2016). As noted above, the majority of working
class Bolivians work in the tertiary sector (70 per cent), with 35 per cent
working in commerce, 20 per cent in services and 11 per cent in transport.
These sectors have low job security, limited access to social services and
consequently high levels of precarity. Part-time work and underemployment
remain prominent aspects of labour conditions under the MAS (Escóbar
de Pabón et al., 2014), with workers in constant flux between employment
activities and unemployment (Webber, 2016).
27. Author interview with Antonio Severiche Brosque and Jorge Márquez, leaders of the Rail-
way Workers’ Confederation, La Paz, 5 July 2016.
28. Author interview with executive secretary of the COB Guido Mitma, La Paz, 5 October
2016.
29. Author’s field notes from COB ampliados, June–September 2016.
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Table 5. Axis Cities: Employment by Sector of Labour Market, 2001–11 (%)
Sector of the Labour Market 2001 2011
State 10.1 8.3
Business 25.1 25.4
Informal Business 13.8 22.4
Family 45.5 40.6
Domestic Service 5.5 3.3
Source: adapted from Escóbar de Pabón et al. (2014: 33), cited in Webber (2016: 1869)
















Total 22.1 55.4 22.5 20.9 27.5 51.6
State 50.7 46.5 2.8 40.8 52.0 7.2
Business 28.7 54.8 16.5 20.4 50.8 28.8
Informal Business 9.9 59.8 30.3 10.5 51.1 38.3
Family 18.4 51.1 30.5 22.7 1.8 75.5
Domestic Service − − 100 1.2 1.7 97.1
Source: Escóbar de Pabón et al. (2014: 36)
Economists from the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y
Agrario (CEDLA), Silvia Escóbar de Pabón, Bruno Rojas and Carlos Arze,
have broken the economy down to examine the material shape of informal-
ity (Escóbar de Pabón et al., 2014). Splitting the economy into five parts —
the state, business, informal business, family and domestic service — they
show that between 2001 and 2011 state sector employment has declined by
almost 2 per cent, while informal businesses’ share of the labour market
has jumped from 13.8 per cent to 22.4 per cent (see Table 5). If we take
the state and business sectors as proxies for the formal economy, argues
Webber (2016: 1870), then employment has been increasingly informalized
and concentrated where rates of extreme precariousness (that is, low income,
high employment insecurity and limited access to social services) are at their
highest (see Table 6). Indeed, according to CEDLA’s analysis, extreme pre-
cariousness has increased from 22.5 per cent in 2001 to 52.5 per cent in 2011
(Table 6). This insecurity, coupled with the extension and intensification of
the working day, contends Webber (2016: 1870), ‘operates politically as an
invisible mechanism of control and discipline of the urban labour force’,
further undermining workers’ rights.
This growing precarity is partly a result of the decoupling of employment
sectors from sectors of capital accumulation. The economic policy of the
MAS has focused on generating a strong internal market through limited re-
distribution from the extractive industries to employment sectors. Through
Garcı́a Linera’s (2008) conception of the ‘plural economy’, the government
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Table 7. Sectoral Structure of Exports by Period, 2002–14 (%)
Economic Activity 2002–05 2011–14
Hydrocarbons 35 51
Mineral Mining 14 17
Manufacturing 45 27
Agriculture 5 6
Source: adapted from Arze (2016: 7)
has deciphered two main types of sectors within the economy: (1) strategic
sectors (hydrocarbons; mining; energy); and (2) employment sectors (agri-
culture; industry; tourism; commerce) (Ministry of Development Planning,
2006: 91). The MAS’s plan is primarily to shift the surplus created by the
strategic sectors to the employment sectors through redistributive mecha-
nisms;30 the improvement of infrastructure, especially roads; and support
for agricultural sectors. The government argues that this redistribution will
increase the purchasing power of Bolivian workers and in turn create internal
demand, an essential prerequisite for future industrialization.
During the Morales regime hydrocarbons and mineral mining have aug-
mented their share of Bolivian exports, growing from 35 and 14 per cent
of exports between 2002 and 2005, to 51 and 17 per cent respectively over
the period 2011–14. Simultaneously, manufacturing’s share of exports has
fallen from 45 per cent to 27 per cent over the same period (see Table 7).
Capital accumulation is being increasingly isolated from domestic markets
and contained in capital-intensive industries with few forward or backward
linkages. Moreover, the ever-deeper insertion of Bolivia into the global mar-
ket as a primary commodity producer makes the economy more susceptible
to fluctuations in global commodity prices and increases reliance on imports
of foreign manufactured goods (Arze, 2016), undermining domestic produc-
tion and aligning the interests of the state with those of international capital
(Coronil, 1997). Under the MAS, the underlying patterns of ownership and
accumulation have remained untouched, allowing multinationals to profit
and continuing the state’s role as guarantor of private property and a stable
investment environment (Webber, 2016).
This is particularly problematic as the COB has no proposals to tackle
the problem of the informalized nature of work or the growing reliance
on extractivism other than an undefined ‘reactivation of the productive ap-
paratus’.31 Which sectors would be targeted, where the technology would
come from and how those sectors would become competitive on the global
stage are left unaddressed, making this an empty proposal. The COB makes
30. The conditional cash transfer programmes Renta Dignidad, Bono Juancito Pinto, and Bono
Juana Azurduy, targeting pensioners, children and young mothers respectively.
31. This was a recurrent theme in my interviews with Bolivian labour leaders and is an often-
reproduced motif of the labour movement in press releases and interviews.
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little effort to integrate informalized sectors into its organization or represent
their interests. Many of the concessions made to the COB only affect work-
ers in the waged sector: the minimum wage has risen from 500 bolivianos
a month before Morales was elected to over 2,000 a month currently (EA
Bolivia, 2017); and the doble aguinaldo (double bonus, introduced in 2013)
gives waged workers two months extra pay if GDP growth is above 4.5 per
cent (Office of the President, 2013: Art. 1). These concessions have only
widened the divide between those represented by the COB and the majority
of Bolivia’s working classes. The concessions appease the narrow bases rep-
resented by the COB without contesting the trends of increasing informality
and precarity in the economy, which are left unchallenged, confirming that
the COB does not represent the general interests of the Bolivian working
classes.
CONCLUSION
Despite the promise of a radical overhaul of the neoliberal political economy,
the economic policies of Evo Morales have maintained a division between
the growth-producing sectors of the economy and the nodes of employment.
At the same time, and in spite of this apparent lack of improvements for the
Bolivian working classes, the COB has become an important political ally of
the government. Over the past 10 years the MAS has managed to assimilate
parts of the COB through awarding political positions to members of the
leadership, and offering the appearance of cooperation by using a socialist
rhetoric. This has created a labour officialdom within the upper echelons
of the COB whose personal interests align with the political aims of the
MAS.
This development has had detrimental effects on the labour movement
under Morales. The defence of the government’s political project has taken
precedence over the needs of the rank-and-file working classes, severely
undermining the ability of the COB to defend the workers they represent in
the face of government anti-labour legislation. Most Bolivians continue to
work in informal, precarious settings, and the informal economy continues
to create most employment opportunities. The COB’s lack of engagement
with growing trends of informalization and precariousness means it fails to
represent the majority of Bolivia’s workers. Its response to these tendencies is
the vague maxim of ‘reactivation of the productive apparatus’, which ignores
the structure of Bolivia’s economy and its insertion into the global capitalist
system as a primary commodities producer, and does not present a concrete
programme of how industrialization would be achieved. In short, although
ostensibly the COB has improved its position vis-à-vis the marginal place it
was assigned under neoliberalism, with access to government ministers and
rhetorical flourishes in its direction from the MAS government, it ultimately
remains incapable of representing the majority of Bolivian workers.
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Grebe López, H. (1998) ‘Los efectos económicos de la globalización en Bolivia: Notas para
una reflexión estratégica’ [‘The Economic Effects of Globalization in Bolivia: Notes
for a Strategic Reflection’]. La Paz: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y
Agrario.
Hurl, C. (2009) ‘The Structure of Betrayal: Trade Union Bureaucracy and Public Sector Struggles
in British Columbia’, Studies in Political Economy 83(1): 141–61.
Labour Bureaucracy and Labour Officaldom in Bolivia 25
Hylton, F. and S. Thomson (2007) Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics.
London: Verso.
Hyman, R. (1989) The Political Economy of Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice in a Cold
Climate. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
INE (2015) ‘Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda, Ronda 2010–2012’ [‘Population and Household
Census, Round 2010–2012’]. La Paz: Instituto Nacional de Estadı́sticas.
Kaup, B.Z. (2014) ‘Divergent Paths of Counter-neoliberalization: Materiality and the Labor
Process in Bolivia’s Natural Resource Sectors’, Environment and Planning A 46(8): 1836–
51.
Klein, H. (2003) ‘Social Change in Bolivia since 1952’, in M.S. Grindle and P. Domingo (eds)
Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective, pp. 232–58. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Kohl, B. (2004) ‘Privatization Bolivian Style: A Cautionary Tale’, International Journal of
Urban and Regional Research 28(4): 893–908.
Lebowitz, M.A. (2003) Beyond Capital: Marx’s Political Economy of the Working Class. Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lebowitz, M.A. (2009) ‘The Path to Human Development: Capitalism or Socialism?’,
Monthly Review 60(9). https://monthlyreview.org/2009/02/01/the-path-to-human-develop
ment-capitalism-or-socialism/ (accessed 8 November 2017).
van der Linden, M. (2008) Workers of the World: Essays toward a Global Labor History. Leiden
and Boston, MA: Brill.
Lora, G. (1946) ‘Tesis Central de la Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros (Tesis de
Pulacayo, 1946)’ [‘Central Thesis of the Union Federation of Miners (Pulacayo Thesis)’].
www.masas.nu (accessed 10 November 2015).
Luxemburg, R. (1906/2004) ‘The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions’, in
H. Peter and K.B. Anderson (eds) The Rosa Luxemburg Reader, pp. 168–99. New York:
Monthly Review Press.
Mandel, E. (1992) Power and Money: A Marxist Theory of Bureaucracy. London: Verso.
Marx, K. (1849/1935) Wage-labour and Capital. New York: International Publishers.
Marx, K. (1867/1982) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1. Harmonsworth:
Penguin Books.
McNelly, A. (2016) ‘Evo Morales and the Limits of 21st Century Socialism’, ROAR Magazine
2 March. https://roarmag.org/essays/bolivia-referendum-morales-lost
McNelly, A. (2017) ‘The Contours of Gramscian Theory in Bolivia: From Government Rhetoric
to Radical Critique’, Constellations 24(3): 432–46.
Ministry of Development Planning (2006) ‘El Plan Nacional de Desarrollo’ [‘National De-
velopment Plan’]. La Paz: Government of Bolivia. https://extranet.who.int/nutrition/gina/
sites/default/files/BOL%202006%20-%20Plan%20Nacional%20de%20Desarrollo.pdf (ac-
cessed 17 March 2017).
Nash, J.C. (1993) We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us: Dependency and Exploitation in
Bolivian Tin Mines. New York: Columbia University Press.
Office of the President (2013) ‘Decreto Supremo 1802’ [‘Supreme Decree 1802’]. La Paz:
Government of Bolivia. www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-DS-N1802.xhtml (accessed 8 April
2017).
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